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THE WIDENING SCOPE OF INSURER'S LIABILITY
What methods of redress are available to a plaintiff whose
insurer has used underhanded techniques to withhold pay-
ments due the insured? Can the insured recover the financial
loss he suffered as a result of the actions of the insurance com-
pany? Can the insurance company be required to pay him pu-
nitive damages as a means of "punishing" the company for its
inexcusable actions? If so, what kind of conduct on the part of
the insurance company might give rise to such a cause of ac-
tion? These questions, which in recent years have confronted
courts in a number of states,' particularly California,' have
produced' several adverse decisions for the insurance industry.
For example, consider the facts in a recent California
case:3 Jerome Gruenberg, the owner of a restaurant and cock-
tail lounge, was insured for a total of $35,000 against fire loss
under policies carried by three insurance companies. In the
early morning hours of November 9, 1969, the restaurant and
lounge were virtually destroyed by fire. A few days after the fire
an adjuster representing the insurance companies told an arson
investigator of the fire department that Gruenberg had exces-
sive fire insurance coverage. Shortly thereafter Gruenberg was
arrested and charged, in a felony complaint, with arson and
defrauding an insurer. Despite the fact that the insurance ad-
juster appeared as a witness for the prosecution and again
stated that Gruenberg's coverage was excessive, the magistrate
found no probable cause for the charges and they were dis-
missed.
While the charges were still pending, however, the insur-
ance company, on the authority of the "cooperation and no-
tice" clause of California's Insurance Code,4 demanded that
See cases discussed in Section 1I infra.
Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Crisci v.
Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Comunale v. Traders & Gen.
Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958); Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 102
Cal. Rptr. 547 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co., 71 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1968); Sharp v. Automobile Club of Southern Calif., 37 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1964).
The facts are taken from Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480 (1973).
' CAL. INS. CODE § 2071 (West 1972). Under a paragraph entitled "Requirements
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Gruenberg submit to an examination under oath and produce
certain documents. In response, Gruenberg explained that he
could not appear during the pendency of the felony prosecution
and asked that the examination be postponed until after the
conclusion of those proceedings. The companies refused this
request and notified him that due to his failure to appear they
were denying liability under the policies.'
Therefore, by alleging that Gruenberg had excessive insur-
ance, which in turn led to a charge of arson, the insurance
companies made it impossible for him to appear for an exami-
nation and thereby avoided liability under the fire insurance
policies. As a result, Gruenberg suffered substantial economic
losses-he lost earnings, was unable to pay his creditors and
ultimately was forced out of business-and considerable emo-
tional distress.
In overturning the trial court's dismissal of Gruenberg's
action against the insurance companies, the California Su-
preme Court in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.' determined
that the actions of the insurers gave rise "to a cause of action
in tort for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing."7 Hence, the court found that Gruenberg could recover
both compensatory and punitive damages from the insurance
companies even without a finding that the insurers engaged in
outrageous conduct.
A review of the development of the law in California before
Gruenberg will allow a fuller understanding of the import of
this case and will prepare the reader for a more detailed analy-
sis of the decision. In addition, a discussion of the evolution
and present status of this area of the law in other states, includ-
ing Kentucky, will be presented. But first, in order to more
in case loss occurs" the section states:
The insured, as often as may be reasonably required, shall exhibit to any
person designated by this company all that remains of any property herein
described, and submit to examinations under oath by any person named by
this company, and subscribe the same; and, as often as may be reasonably
required, shall produce for examination all books of account, bills, invoices
and other vouchers. ...
Under a paragraph entitled "Suit", CAL. INS. CODE § 2071 (West 1972) states:
"No suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable...
unless all the requirements of this policy shall have been complied with .
510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (Cal. 1973).
Id. at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
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fully appreciate the recent changes in the nature and scope of
insurer's liability, a brief incursion into the historical back-
ground of this area of the law will be helpful.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF INSURER'S LABILrrY
A. Contract Liability
There are several theories upon which an insured party can
base an action against a recalcitrant insurance company. One
such theory is breach of contract. Historically, however, dam-
ages recoverable for breach of contract have been severely lim-
ited, normally being restricted to those that were foreseeable
by the parties at the time they made the contract.' Thus, in
actions for breach of "commercial", as opposed to "personal",
contracts, damages for mental suffering generally are not re-
coverable.' Whenever the contract is considered "personal",
however, courts ordinarily allow recovery for mental suffering
caused by the breach in addition to the damages normally
recoverable, since "personal" contracts involve the plaintiff's
interests of "personality" and damages for mental suffering are
foreseeable.' 0 Examples of "personal" contracts are contracts
to marry, contracts between hotels or common carriers and
their guests, contracts for medical services, and contracts for
the disposition of corpses."
Insurance contracts, on the other hand, have generally
been held to be commercial in nature;12 therefore, the insured
party's recoverable damages historically have been quite lim-
ited. He can neither recover for mental suffering caused by the
I Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145,
1199-1203 (1970). These damages may include consequential damages in addition to
the amount of the contract itself whenever such consequential damages were reasona-
bly foreseeable by the breaching party at the time the contract was made. Id. at 1202-
03.
' 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1076, at 425 (1964) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN]; C.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 145, at 592 (1935) [hereinafter cited
as McCORMICK]; 11 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1341, at 214 (Jaeger ed. 1968)
[hereinafter cited as WILLISTON].
' CORBN § 1076, at 429; McCORMICK § 145, at 593; WILLISTON § 1341, at 216.
CORBIN § 1076, at 429; MCCORMICK § 145, at 593-94; WILLISTON § 1341, at 216-
17.
12 Note, Damages for Mental Suffering Caused by Insurers: Recent Developments
in the Law of Tort and Contract, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1303 (1973).
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insurer's refusal to pay under the policies nor recoup the finan-
cial losses caused by such actions.
Punitive damages likewise are not generally assessed for
breach of contract. 3 However, in an effort to protect the public
from delays in payment utilized by insurance companies to
force favorable settlements, some states have enacted statutes
authorizing an assessment of limited punitive damages against
recalcitrant insurance companies.'4 These damages, consisting
of a penalty and an award of attorney fees, are payable where
the insurer fails or delays in bad faith to pay a claim.' 5 Gener-
Ally, though, the statutory penalties for vexatious refusal to pay
a claim are not inflicted unless the evidence shows that the
refusal was willful and without reasonable cause, and it is not
enough merely that the judgment after trial is against the in-
surer.'6
B. Tort
In spite of the penalty statutes enacted by states, the rem-
edies for breach of contract have proven to be an ineffective
mean§ of redressing the insured's injuries. Because of this,
many policy holders have recently turned to the law of torts to
find a more satisfactory basis of recovery.
The tort action that appears to be most promising as a
means of aiding the beleaguered insured is "the intentional
infliction of emotional distress." 7 Because of the difficulty of
proving mental injuries and of measuring damages, and the
fear of opening the door to fictitious and trivial claims, only
recently have courts recognized this as a distinct and sufficient
cause of action in and of itself.'8 The first movement in that
,3 CORBIN § 1077, at 438; WILLISTON § 1340, at 209-11.
"1 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3238 (1966); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:658; Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 375.420 (1968).
44 AM. JuR. 2d Insurance § 1798, at 718 (1969).
IS Id. at 720.
,7 This tort is variously called the intentional infliction of mental distress, mental
suffering, mental anguish, mental disturbance or emotional distress. For the sake of
consistency, it will be referred to throughout this Note as the intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
" W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 50-51 [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, at 22 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1957)
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
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direction occurred in cases holding common carriers liable for
insulting remarks made to passengers by their employees. 9
This liability for using profane language or grossly insulting
people of ordinary sensibilities has been extended to innkeepers
and public utilities" and has been applied even in situations
where the mental disturbance was not evidenced by any physi-
cal illness. In such cases the liability is imposed because of the
special obligation of the particular defendant to the public.2'
The courts are in virtually unanimous agreement, how-
ever, that an ordinary defendant cannot be held liable for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress unless the plaintiff's
evidence satisfies a much more stringent standard.22 It is not
enough that he show that the defendant intended to cause the
mental distress or that his conduct could be characterized as
malicious. For the plaintiff to recover, he must demonstrate
that the defendant's conduct was "so outrageous in character,
and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds
of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intoler-
able in a civilized community." 3
According to the late Dean Prosser and the Restatement
(Second) of Torts [hereinafter Restatement], the presence of
either or both of two factors, tends to make a finding of outra-
geous conduct on the part of the defendant more likely. The
first factor consists of the abuse of some relationship or some
position of power held by the defendant which gives him the
means of injuring the plaintiff.24 This factor has served as the
basis for imposing liability on collection agencies for using
high-pressure methods of collection and on insurance adjusters
for attempting to coerce insured parties into settlements. Such
liability is usually based on a prolonged course of harassment
including such conduct as threats of arrest, threats to ruin
one's credit rating or to file a lawsuit, or attempts to exert
" PROSSER § 12, at 52; RESTATEMENT § 48, at 34; Magruder, Mental and Emotional
Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REV. 1033, 1052-53 (1936).
PROSSER § 12, at 53; RESTATEMENT § 48, at 34.
PROSSER § 12, at 53; RESTATEMENT § 48, at 34.
PROSSER § 12, at 54-55; RESTATEMENT § 46, at 22.
2 RESTATEMENT § 46, at 22; Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALiF. L. REV. 40, 43
(1956).
2, PROSSER § 12, at 56; RESTATEMENT § 46, at 24; Prosser, Insult and Outrage, supra
note 23, at 47.
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pressure by involving the insured's employer, relatives and
friends. 5 Even in cases of this type, however, there still must
be extreme and outrageous conduct; mere rude conduct is not
sufficient to allow recovery. Likewise, the defendant is not lia-
ble when he does no more than what he has a legal right to do.21
The second factor which, when present, often provides the
requisite degree of "outrage" is knowledge on the part of the
defendant that the plaintiff is particularly susceptible to emo-
tional distress due to some physical or mental condition.Y Al-
though threatening or abusive language does not generally con-
stitute conduct sufficiently outrageous to form the basis for a
cause of action, it has been so held in a number of cases involv-
ing sick people, children, and pregnant women where the de-
fendant was aware of the condition. 21
Once it has been established that the defendant's conduct
was indeed extreme or outrageous, it must be determined
whether or not the plaintiff actually suffered severe emotional
distress. When the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress first came to be recognized, it was necessary that such
distress be evidenced by some physical illness. It was only in
1948 that the Restatement was modified to reflect the fact that
a physical illness is no longer required by a substantial number
of jurisdictions. 9 However, it appears that where the conduct
is not clearly outrageous, the courts impose a correspondingly
greater requirement of physical distress. Conversely, if the en-
ormity of the outrage is clear, bodily harm is not required.30
II. DEVELOPMENT OF INSURER'S LIABiLITY iN CALIFORNIA
In deciding Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.,31 the Su-
preme Court of California relied mainly on four California
cases: Richardson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp. ,32
' PROSSER § 12, at 57; Prosser, Insult and Outrage, supra note 23, at 48-49.
26 Prosser, Insult and Outrage, supra note 23, at 49-50.
2 PROSSER § 12, at 58; RESTATEMENT § 46, at 25; Prosser, Insult and Outrage, supra
note 23, at 50.
2 PROSSER § 12, at 58; Prosser, Insult and Outrage, supra note 23, at 51. See also
RESTATEMENT § 46, at 25 (illustrations 10-14).
2RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 46 (Supp. 1948). This statement has been retained in
§ 46 of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1957).
" PROSSER § 12, at 59.
31 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
32 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
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Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co.,- Crisci v.
Security Insurance Co.,31 and Comunale v. Traders & General
Insurance Co.35 In Comunale and Crisci the court considered
the duty of an insurance carrier to accept reasonable settle-
ments under liability policies protecting the insured against
third parties. In Richardson and Fletcher, on the other hand,
the court was concerned with the duty of a carrier to refrain
from unreasonably withholding payments due under first party
policies requiring payment to the insured. The court in
Gruenberg, however, found that these two duties were merely
parallel aspects of the same obligation-the responsibility im-
plied by law in every insurance contract "under which the in-
surer must act fairly and in good faith in discharging its con-
tractual responsibilities." 31 Thus, despite some differences in
the precise issues considered, all four cases were pertinent to
the Gruenberg decision and a discussion of each of them is
essential to understanding the development of the law of in-
surer's liability in California.
A. Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co.
In Comunale the California Supreme Court discussed at
some length the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
required under every contract and for the first time analyzed
this duty as it applies to insurance contracts. This covenant
requires the insurer to settle when it is possible and when it
seems to be the most reasonable manner of disposing of the
claim even if the express terms of the policy do not impose such
a duty. The court stated that when deciding whether to com-
promise a claim, the insurer must give at least as much consid-
eration to the insured's interests as it does to its own. 7 In
addition, the court found that an insurer who denies coverage
does so at its own risk and will be held liable for all damage
suffered by the insured party even when the denial of coverage
is not entirely groundless.3 Indeed, in Comunale the insurer
89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
a' 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
3 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).
510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485.




had denied coverage and refused to defend a suit against the
insured, because it believed that the accident, having occurred
while the insured was driving a truck which did not belong to
him, was not covered by the policy. The court, however, de-
clared that an insurer's reasonable belief as to lack of coverage
is no defense if in fact it is erroneous. Since the trial court
determined that the accident was covered by the policy, the
company's belief was erroneous and it was therefore liable for
the entire judgment against the insured even though it ex-
ceeded the policy limits.
The precise holding in Comunale is that a liability carrier
cannot escape its obligation to settle within policy limits by
refusing to defend its insured. 9 The court further stated that
when there is no opportunity to settle the claim within policy
limits and there is only a breach of the duty to defend, the
liability of the insurer would be restricted to the policy limits
plus attorneys' fees and court costs since this is the only dam-
age suffered by the insured.' However, when there is also a
refusal to accept an offer of settlement within policy limits, this
latter refusal is the determinative factor in fixing the extent of
the insurer's liability and the insurer should be held liable for
the entire judgment against the insured. 4'
In addition to the implied covenant of good faith, there
was yet another important dimension to Comunale. While
most actions for wrongful refusal to settle are pursued as tort
claims, the complaint in Comunale was based on breach of
contract, since otherwise the suit would have been barred by
31 Id. at 198. It is generally held that an insurance carrier has a duty to attempt
to settle a claim within policy limits. This duty arises out of the exclusive power given
by the terms of the policy to the insurance company with respect to settlement of a
claim. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 178 (1955); Keeton, Liability Insurance and Re-
sponsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1136 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Kee-
ton]. When the insurer wrongfully refuses to settle within policy limits, the insurer is
generally held liable for the entire judgment entered against the insured even when it
exceeds policy limits. Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 171-72 (1955). There is a difference of
opinion, however, as to whether liability should be restricted to the exercise of good
faith or whether there should be liability for negligence in rejecting an offer to settle a
claim regardless of good faith. Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 171 (1955); Keeton, supra, at
1139-40. California, along with the majority of jurisdictions, rejects the negligence test
and only requires good faith in refusing a settlement offer. Brown v. Guarantee Ins.
Co., 319 P.2d 69 (Cal. 1958); Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 171 (1955).




the statute of limitations. The court upheld this approach,
declaring that such an action sounds both in contract and in
tort and that the plaintiff may choose to proceed under either
of these theories.42 This represents a marked change from the
general rule that such a cause of action sounds only in tort. 3
The court, in effect, changed the insurer's right to settle into a
contractual duty.
As noted earlier, damages for breach of contract are gener-
ally limited to the amount of the contract plus interest. Here,
however, the recovery was for the entire judgment entered
against the insured, including the excess over policy limits.
This "excess" recovery was allowed, the court explained, in
view of a California statute which defined the measure of dam-
ages for a breach of contract as that amount which will com-
pensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately
caused by the breach, or which, in the ordinary course of
things, would be likely to result from the breach.4 Moreover,
the court found that recovery in excess of policy limits was
possible in spite of another section of the California Civil Code
which provided that a person could not recover a greater
amount in damages for breach of an obligation than he could
have gained by full performance. 5 The court reasoned that
permitting a recovery in excess of the policy limits would in-
deed place the insured in the same position that he would have
been in if there had been full performance under the contract. 6
B. Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.
The next case relied upon by the Gruenberg court was
Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. 47 In affirming a verdict $91,000
in excess of the policy limits, the court reiterated its statement
in Comunale that an action for wrongful refusal to settle may
be brought either in tort or in contract and disapproved con-
," Id. at 203. The court pointed out that such election is not available when the
tort character of the action prevails as in suits for personal injury caused by negligence.
Id.
, Keeton, supra note 39, at 1138 n.5; Comment, Liability of Insurer for Failure
to Settle, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 783 (1959).
" CAL. CIv. CODE § 3300 (West 1970).
" Id. at § 3358.
" Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 202 (Cal. 1958).
" 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
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trary language in Critz v. Farmers Insurance Group,4" a Califor-
nia District Court of Appeal decision, that might be interpreted
as providing that such a cause of action sounds only in con-
tract. In addition to the excess recovery, the court approved
a $25,000 verdict for mental distress induced by the insurance
carrier's refusal to accept a $9,000 offer of settlement (with
Mrs. Crisci offering to pay $2,500 of the amount), a figure
within the limits of a $10,000 liability policy covering an apart-
ment building owned by Mrs. Crisci. Mrs. DiMare, a tenant
who was injured in a fall on a staircase outside the building,
had sued Mrs. Crisci seeking damages for physical injuries as
well as for a severe resulting psychosis. Security's highest offer
of settlement was for $3,000 despite the fact that its lawyer and
adjusters advised that a verdict would likely exceed $100,000
if, in regard to the alleged psychosis, the jury believed Mrs.
DiMare's expert witnesses. After a jury verdict in favor of Mrs.
DiMare for $101,000, 5° Mrs. Crisci, an immigrant widow of 70,
lost her apartment building, became indigent and dependent
upon her grandchildren and attempted suicide several times.
Based on these facts, Mrs. Crisci argued that an insurance
carrier should be held absolutely liable for any excess judgment
when the carrier refuses to settle within policy limits. The court
did not actually reject such a rule and noted several arguments
in favor of a rule of this kind.5 However, the court found it
unnecessary to impose absolute liability in this case since it
determined that Security should be held liable for a breach of
its duty as enunciated by Comunale to give as much weight to
the interests of its insured as it gave to its own. Since Security's
belief that the plaintiff had no chance of winning the suit was
unreasonable under the circumstances, it was held liable for
the excess judgment.5 2
In affirming the award for mental suffering in addition to
the excess judgment, the Crisci court took Comunale one step
further and broadened the scope of allowable damages in an
action against the insurer for refusal to settle. While noting
41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965).
426 P.2d at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
DiMare v. Cresci, 373 P.2d 860, 23 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1962). In the first suit, the
insured was sued as "Rosina Cresci".
1, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
52 Id. at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
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that damages for mental suffering are most commonly awarded
in connection with physical injury resulting from negligent or
intentional misconduct, the court recognized that in several
cases the California courts had approved an award of damages
for mental suffering where there was a tortious interference
with property rights without personal injuries apart from the
mental suffering. Furthermore, in support of its decision the
court invoked the broad principle that an injured party should
be compensated for all damage proximately caused by a wrong-
doer." Moreover, the court held that if the conduct is tortious
an award for mental suffering will be approved despite the fact
that the conduct also involves a breach of contract.54 While
observing that the denial of damages for mental suffering re-
sulting from breach of contract is generally based on the theory
that allowing such damages would open the door to fictitious
claims, the court found that when there is "tortious conduct
resulting in substantial invasions of clearly protected property
interests"-5 in addition to a breach of contract, the danger of
fictitious claims is reduced and damages for mental suffering
should be allowed.5 6
It has been asserted that the approval by Crisci of an
award of damages for mental suffering places insurance con-
tracts into the realm of "personal" contracts for the first time.5 1
However, this contention would mean that damages for mental
suffering would be permitted for breach of any insurance con-
tract. This writer does not believe the court intended this to be
the case. The court seems to have carefully restricted recovery
of mental suffering for breach of contract to those cases where
there is also tortious conduct which results in "substantial in-
vasions of clearly protected property interests."5 Thus, unless
the court interprets any breach of an insurance contract to be
a substantial interference with clearly protected property inter-
Id., 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
Id., 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
Id. at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19 (footnote omitted).
3'Id.
Note, Damages for Mental Suffering Caused by Insurers: Recent Developments
in the Law of Tort and Contract, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1303, 1304-05 (1973). For a
discussion of "personal" and "commercial" contracts, see text accompanying notes 9-
12 supra.
11 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19 (footnote omitted).
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ests, damages for mental suffering would not always be allowed
for breach of an insurance contract.
C. Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co.
The third case relied upon by the court in the Gruenberg
case was Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co.," a
case in which the insured party sought compensatory and puni-
tive damages from his insurance carrier for alleged intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Whereas in Crisci mental suf-
fering was incidental to other damages, in Fletcher mental suf-
fering constituted the cause of action itself. The insured, a 41-
year-old common laborer with eight children, earned about
$289.00 a week by working 70 to 80 hours. Desiring to protect
his family, he purchased disability insurance from the defen-
dant insurance company. The policy provided for payments of
$150 per month for as long as he should be totally disabled from
sickness or injury. If the disability were due to sickness, the
payments were to be limited to two years. If injury caused the
disability, however, the payments would continue for 30 years.
The plaintiff sustained a back injury in the course of his
employment and was unable to work again. Doctors who exam-
ined him were virtually in unanimous agreement that he was
disabled because of the injury to his back. Despite the over-
whelming medical evidence, the insurance company undertook
a concerted course of action designed to persuade the claimant
to surrender his insurance policy or enter into an unfavorable
settlement. The insurance company, seizing upon a statement
made by one of the consulting physicians which indicated that
his back problem might be related to a congenital back ail-
ment, determined that the plaintiff should be paid under the
sickness provision. In addition, the insurance company accused
him of a misrepresentation in his application for the insurance
since he did not disclose this congenital back ailment even
though it was abundantly clear that he had not been aware of
the ailment at the time he applied for the insurance. The com-
pany eventually terminated the disability payments and de-
manded that the plaintiff return any sums that he had already
received.
51 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
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In his suit against the insurer, the plaintiff alleged that the
insurer had maliciously and in bad faith refused to pay benefits
to which he was entitled. The company conceded that its con-
duct was deplorable and outrageous, but a claim supervisor for
the company testified that in another case with the same facts
he would undertake the same course of conduct as that used
against the insured in this case. After considering the facts, the
jury returned a verdict of $60,000 compensatory damages and
$650,000 punitive damages, but the plaintiff accepted a remis-
sion of the punitive damages to $180,000.60
On appeal a primary issue was whether the action sounded
in tort on in contract. It was argued that the cause of action
sounded solely in contract and therefore that the award of pu-
nitive damages and damages for mental suffering should not be
allowed to stand. However, the court, deciding to extend the
Crisci holding to disability insurance contracts, held that the
action sounded in tort even though it may also have constituted
a breach oficontract and that the actions of the insurance com-
pany could legally form the basis for a claim for damages for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.61 Noting that the
decision could probably rest solely upon the foregoing holding,
the court held additionally that, independent of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the 6onduct of the
disability insurer constituted a "tortious interference with a
protected property interest of its insured for which damages
may be recovered to compensate for all detriment proximately
resulting therefrom" 2 including economic loss, emotional dis-
tress, and punitive damages. The court reasoned that in a case
such as this the invasion of economic interests might well out-
weigh the direct invasion of emotional tranquility. Hence, the
dual holding of Fletcher would permit recovery in future cases
" Id. at 82; see also Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co., 95 Cal. Rptr. 678 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1971), where an award of $1,050 compensatory and $200,000 punitive damages
was upheld against a disability insurer for fraudulently inducing an insured not to
cancel the policy by knowingly false representations that the policy would pay lifetime
benefits if the insured were permanently disabled; and 37 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Cal. Ct. App.
1964) where the court, though finding the award excessive, held that an award of
punitive damages was supported by the evidence since the agent of the insurer fraudu-
lently misrepresented that all medical bills incurred by the insured and his family
would be paid regardless of the existence of other collectible insurance.
'l 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
82 Id. at 93-94.
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for all types of injury suffered. In this second holding the court
applied the California Supreme Court's rule set forth in Crisci
that recovery will be permitted for the tortious interference by
an insurance company with a protected property interest of its
insured.13 The court explained that this rule, which redirected
judicial emphasis and allowed recovery of all proximately
caused detriment in a single cause of action, would foster pub-
lic respect for and confidence in the judicial process more than
a rule which required attorneys, litigants and judges "to force
square pegs into round holes."64 Obviously disturbed at the
injury being suffered by insured parties at the hands of some
insurance carriers, the court went beyond the point necessary
for a decision in the case in order to increase the cause of action
available to an insured.
As noted earlier, 5 two factors are listed by the late Dean
Prosser and the Restatement as being significant in determin-
ing whether liability should be imposed for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. Both factors were found to be pres-
ent in Fletcher. The first factor, it will be recalled, is the abuse
of the relationship between the parties or the abuse of a posi-
tion of power enjoyed by the defendant. In Fletcher the court
stated that an insurer has a special relationship with its in-
sured with certain concomitant implied duties owed to the in-
sured. " This relationship arises to some extent out of the great
disparity in economic situations between the two parties and
to some extent out of the fact that the insured party does not
contract to obtain a commercial advantage but merely to pro-
tect himself against the risk of accidental loss. Hence, by the
very nature of the contract, the issuer of an insurance contract
is particularly vulnerable to a claim of oppressive tactics and
outrageous conduct.
The second significant factor was present since the plain-
tiff was found to be particularly susceptible to emotional dis-
tress due to his disabled and impecunious condition, and the
63 See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra. Notice that this second holding was
later interpreted by the California Supreme Court as a finding that the insurer had
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d
1032, 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485 (1973).
89 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
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defendants were well aware of this condition." This susceptibil-
ity to emotional distress precipitated by the insured party's
impecunious position is very likely to be present in any case of
an insurance company's failure to pay under a policy; there-
fore, there is an increased likelihood that under similar circum-
stances any insurance company's conduct will be found to be
outrageous.
In addition to the two factors just discussed, it has been
argued that a third factor, one which occupied a position of
preeminence in Crisci and Comunale, influenced the Fletcher
court even more. 8 This factor was the implied-in-law duty of
good faith and fair dealing owed by an insurer to its insured.
This duty, as explained by the court in Fletcher,
imposes upon a disability insurer a duty not to threaten to
withhold or actually withhold payments, maliciously and
without probable cause, for the purpose of injuring its insured
by depriving him of the benefits of the policy."
Notably, Fletcher's suit was based upon the insurer's bad faith
interpretation of the medical reports and its attempt to reduce
its liability based on this interpretation. Such conduct, though
possibly unethical, is legally permissible and employed in
many situations; however, these tactics were not tolerated in-
Fletcher because of the duty of good faith and fair dealing owed
by an insurer to its insured.7"
D. Richardson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.
In Richardson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp. ,n'
the fourth in the series of California cases figuring heavily in
Gruenberg, two plaintiffs, husband and wife, sought compen-
satory and exemplary damages against their insurance carrier
who had deliberately withheld a payment of $20,000 due under
an uninsured motorist clause. The company had persisted in
its refusal to pay even though it had been repeatedly advised
" Id. at 91.
Keenan & Gillespie, The Insurer and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Mental
Distress: Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 39 INs. COUNSEL J. 335, 339 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Keenan & Gillespie].
89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
, Keenan & Gillespie, supra note 68, at 340.
" 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
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by its local office that the claim was perfectly valid. By so
doing, it forced the plaintiffs to invoke an arbitration provision
in the policy applicable in case of disagreement between the
insured and the insurer. After the arbitrator awarded plaintiffs
the full policy limits, the insurance carrier ordered its local
office to make the best possible settlement. The plaintiffs were
thus finally -able to collect the payments due only after the
expenditure of considerable effort and the passage of over a
year, despite the fact that the insurance company was cogni-
zant of the validity of their claim within two months after the
accident.
The actual damages suffered by the plaintiffs due to the
defendant's failure to settle the claim without arbitration were
$1,996.93, which included attorneys' fees and the plaintiffs'
share of the cost of the arbitration proceedings. At the trial the
jury rendered verdicts of $10,000 (the policy limits) for each
plaintiff against the insurance company for its failure to settle
in good faith. Moreover, the jury also returned a general verdict
in the amounts of $75,000 for the husband and $100,000 for the
wife.
On appeal the intermediate appellate court found that
"[tIhis conduct toward its own insured was unconscionable,
and constituted a tortious breach of contract. 72 As in previous
cases of this type, the defendant argued that the plaintiffs'
action was for breach of contract and that punitive damages
were not authorized. As the California courts had done several
times before, however, the court held that the suit rested upon
a tortious breach by the insurer of its obligation to deal fairly
and in good faith with its own insured; the fact that the con-
duct also constituted a breach of an implied covenant did not
prevent the recovery of punitive damages.13 The court found,
moreover, that an award of punitive damages was justified
since the conduct of the insurance company constituted op-
pression and since, in addition, malice could be inferred from
the circumstances of the case.74
In spite of the above findings, the case was remanded for
retrial on the issue of damages. The court explained that "[tio
72 Id. at 552.




support an award for anxiety and emotional distress, there
must be evidence of 'severe emotional distress' . . .,"I The
evidence in the instant case regarding anxiety and emotional
distress consisted only of testimony by Mrs. Richardson that
as a result of the insurance company's refusal to pay their
claim, creditors had pressed the Richardsons to pay their bills
and that the plaintiffs had had to borrow money to pay taxicab
fares and parking expenses incurred in obtaining medical treat-
ment for their injuries. The court found that this evidence was
not sufficient to support an award for anxiety and emotional
distress;76 therefore, since it was not possible to determine from
the general verdict how much of the award was for anxiety and
emotional distress, the case was remanded for retrial on the
issue of damages.7 7 Thus the intermediate appellate court im-
posed upon the plaintiffs the restrictive requirements held in
Fletcher to be necessary for an award of damages for mental
suffering even though two entirely different causes of action
were involved; Fletcher involved an action for intentional infl-
iction of emotional distress, whereas the cause of action in
Richardson was for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing."
E. Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.
This series of California cases culminated in the decision
of Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 79 the facts of which were
outlined earlier.8 0 Gruenberg, claiming that he had suffered
"9Csevere economic damage', 'severe emotional upset and dis-
tress', loss of earnings and various special damages, 8 1 sought
compensatory and punitive damages for the outrageous con-
duct of the defendants. He alleged that the defendants acted
Is Id. at 553, citing Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 90
(Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
, Id. at 553.
Id. at 557.
7' The quoted language from Richardson requiring evidence of severe emotional
distress to support an award for anxiety and emotional distress was expressly disap-
proved by the California Supreme Court in Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032,
108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
71 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
See text accompanying notes 3-5 supra.
", 510 P.2d at 1035, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
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intentionally and in bad faith for the sole purpose of depriving
him of the benefits of the fire insurance policies issued by the
insurance companies, thereby breaching their duty of good
faith' and fair dealing.
Gruenberg's complaint was dismissed by the trial court,
and the dismissal was affirmed by the intermediate appellate
court on the ground that the defendants' conduct could not be
considered so outrageous as to constitute a basis for suit in
tort.8 2 The California Supreme Court, however, upheld the
complaint against the recalcitrant insurance companies and
remanded the case to the.trial court.
The court discussed at length each of the California cases
heretofore analyzed and found a common legal principle under-
lying each of them:
[I]n every insurance contract there is an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. The duty to so act is
imminent in the contract whether the company is attending
to the claims of third persons against the insured or the
claims of the insured itself. Accordingly, when the insurer
unreasonably and in bad faith withholds payment of the
claim of its insured, it is subject to liability in tort."
The court held that since Gruenberg had indeed alleged facts
sufficient to constitute a breach of this duty, he was entitled
to a trial on the issues.
The insurance companies countered by claiming that
Gruenberg's failure to submit to an examination under oath as
required by the "cooperation and notice" clause of the Califor-
nia Insurance Code 4 acted as a bar to his cause of action. They
contended that since plaintiff breached his contractual duties,
their duty of good faith and fair dealing was excused. The
California Supreme Court found, however, that the insurer's
duty is absolute, implied by law in every insurance contract,
and that the nonperformance by the insured of his contractual
duties does not excuse a breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing by the insurer while the contract is still in effect.8 5
The defendants next argued that Gruenberg could not re-
1 Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 103 Cal. Rptr. 887 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
" See note 4 supra.
510 P.2d at 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
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cover for mental suffering since he had not alleged conduct on
their part which was "extreme" or "outrageous". The court,
unexpectedly, found that there was no need for a showing of
extreme or outrageous conduct. This was predicated on the fact
that Gruenberg's suit was not founded on the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress but instead was based on a sepa-
rate tort formerly recognized by the court in Crisci. Quoting
from Crisci, the court explained that"' . . . a plaintiff who as
a result of a defendant's tortious conduct loses his property and
suffers mental distress may recover not only for pecuniary loss
but also for his mental distress.' "86 Moreover, when these ele-
ments are present it is not necessary for recovery that there be
outrageous conduct or that the mental distress be severe.
The court noted that a distinction must be made between
those cases, as in Fletcher, which are based solely on the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress and those cases
such as Crisci where other interests have been invaded and
emotional distress is merely an element of damages." The court
intended no change in the requirement, as set out in Section
46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that, when the action
is based solely on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, there must be a showing of intentional, extreme or
outrageous conduct which causes severe emotional distress to
support a recovery. However, since Gruenberg sought recovery,
not for the independent tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, but for mental distress resulting from a "sub-
stantial invasion of property interests,"88 he could recover dam-
ages for mental suffering whether or not the action of the insur-
ance companies was "extreme" or "outrageous". The court, in
reaching this decision, specifically disapproved of language in
Richardson" which indicated that a plaintiff must prove a case
of outrageous conduct in order to be awarded damages for emo-
tional distress in a suit against an insurer for breach of his duty
of good faith and fair dealing.
As a result of Gruenberg, the California Supreme Court
Id. at 1041, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 489, citing Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d
173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19 (1967) (emphasis added by the Gruenberg Court).
" 510 P.2d at 1041, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
" Id., 108 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
" See text accompanying notes 79-82 supra.
510 P.2d at 1042 n. 10, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 480 n.10.
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has now extended this new tort of breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing to an 'unprecedented degree. This tort,
first applied to insurance contracts by the California Supreme
Court in 1958 in Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance
Co.," no longer requires a showing of outrageous conduct on the
part of the insurer to support a recovery for mental suffering
so long as there has been a "substantial invasion of property
interests of the insured. '9 2 This does not seem to be a very
restrictive requirement, since there is likely to be a substantial
invasion of the insured's property interests in every case in
which the insurer refuses to pay under an insurance policy.
Hence, the California Supreme Court appears to have opened
a wide door through which insured parties may bring actions
against recalcitrant insurance companies.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF INSURER'S LIABILITY IN OTHER STATES
While few states have followed California's lead in liber-
ally broadening the scope of insurer's liability, there does seem
to be a trend developing in several states to extend an insurer's
liability to some degree. Although most states still view an
action by an insured against its insurer for delay or refusal to
make payments due under a policy as one solely in contract
with the accompanying limitations on recoverable damages,
some courts have held that consequential damages, damages
for mental suffering and even punitive damages are recoverable
against a refractory insurance company.
A. Damages for Mental Suffering
The courts of several states have held that damages for
mental suffering are recoverable against a recalcitrant insur-
ance company. However, the court that has taken the biggest
step in following the lead of the California courts is the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applying Illi-
nois law. In Eckenrode v. Life of America Insurance Co.," the
plaintiff sought damages for severe emotional injury suffered as
a result of the insurer's outrageous conduct in refusing to pay
1, 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).
92 510 P.2d at 1041, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
93 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972).
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the proceeds of a $5,000 policy covering the life of her husband.
The policy stated that the proceeds were payable upon proof
of death from accidental causes; however, when the plaintiff
submitted a claim after her husband was the victim of a homi-
cide, the insurer repeatedly refused to make payment and at-
tempted to coerce her into compromising the claim even
though it was fully aware that she had a valid claim and that
she was in dire financial straits. By reason of the insurance
company's failure to pay her claim she had no money for fu-
neral expenses, had to borrow money to support her children,
and had to live with and accept charity from her family, all of
which caused her to suffer severe mental distress.
Anticipating how the Illinois Supreme Court would decide
the case, the Seventh Circuit found that on the facts presented
plaintiff could recover damages for severe mental distress al-
leged to be the result of the insurer's conduct. Noting that the
Illinois Supreme Court had eleven years before recognized the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress,94 the Seventh
Circuit opined that the Illinois Supreme Court, finding that the
facts alleged constituted such a tort, would follow the Califor-
nia courts in applying the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress to insurance contracts.
In so finding, the Seventh Circuit relied heavily upon the
decisions of the California courts in Crisci v. Security Insur-
ance Co.95 and Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance
Co.9" The Eckenrode court found, as had the Fletcher court, 97
the presence of the two factors mentioned earlier 8 which make
one's conduct particularly susceptible to a finding of outrage.
The court detected an abuse of the insurance company's posi-
tion of power when it attempted to delay payment and to in-
crease plaintiff's financial distress by forcing an unfavorable
settlement.9 In addition, the court stated that since the very
purpose of the insurance was to alleviate the beneficiary's criti-
cal financial circumstances upon her husband's death, the in-
surance company was on notice that plaintiff would be particu-
'" See Knierim v. Izzo, 174 N.E.2d 157 (I1. 1961).
" 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
" 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
" See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
" 470 F.2d 1, 4-5 (7th Cir. 1972).
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larly susceptible to mental distress due to her financial
plight.'""
To further support its holding, the court observed in pass-
ing that the insurance industry affects many people and is
"stamped with a public interest.""°' They also noted, without
attaching to it the importance accorded it by the California
courts, the fact that insurance contracts are subject to implied
conditions of good faith and fair dealing and4, that the action
sounds both in contract and tort.0 2 It has been suggested the
court indicated that, in addition to a tort claim, an action in
contract would lie against an insurance company for breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing and that mental distress
would be a foreseeable result of a breach of those implied duties
due to the very nature of the risks insured against it.113 If such
was indeed the intention of the court, it would bring this case
into even closer alignment with the California decisions and
would constitute a significant change in the damages normally
recoverable for breach of an insurance contract.''
The Court of Appeals of Michigan has also held that an
insured party may recover for mental suffering caused by an
insurance company's wrongful acts, provided such acts were
done with the intent of causing mental suffering. In Frishett v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,' 5 the court held
that a complaint stated a cause of action where the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant insurer, who was the insurance car-
rier for both vehicles in an automobile collision, wrongfully
withheld medical payments, made false statements, and ob-
tained information of a private nature to use against the plain-
tiff in her suit against the driver of the other automobile. The
plaintiff claimed that as a result of this conduct she suffered
emotional distress. Since the complaint alleged that the defen-
dant intended to inflict extreme mental suffering, the court
found that the case was distinguishable from a prior decision
of that court in which it was held that there could be no recov-
10 Id.
,o Id. at 5.
102 Id.
1" Note, Damages for Mental Suffering Caused by Insurers: Recent Developments
in the Law of Tort and Contract, 48 NOTRE DaE LAw. 1303, 1311 (1973).
101 See text accompanying notes 9-12 supra.
10 143 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966).
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ery for mental distress unless accompanied by physical in-
jury. 10 Hence, the court found that the law of Michigan does
recognize the tort of intentional infliction of mental suffering
and this tort would apply in the insurance contract context.
0 7
The United States District Court for Connecticut, apply-
ing general principles of Connecticut law, has also joined the
trend by extending the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress to the area of insurance contracts."8 In defining
the duty of an insurer to its insured, the court stated that an
insurer must consider the insured's interests equally with his
own and that if the insurer fails to exercise "good faith or due
care" in determining whether to accept an offered settlement,
the insured may have a cause of action in tort, contract, or
both. '9 Applying this principle to the case before it, the court
found that an insured may recover damages for intentional
infliction of emotional distress for the insurer's failure to de-
fend and failure to settle the suit within policy limits. In find-
ing that such a recovery would be allowed, the court imposed
the restriction that the emotional distress must be shown to be
"the foreseeable and proximate result of the defendant's inten-
tional, wanton or willful wrongful conduct."1' 10 Noting that the
plaintiff's burden might be difficult to meet, the court, never-
theless, found that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action.
Another court which recognizes a cause of action for emo-
tional distress is the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Oregon. In Brown v. First Insurance Co.,"' it held that
under either Washington or Hawaii law (the two states having
a relationship to the occurrence) a plaintiff can generally re-
cover damages for emotional distress if the defendant's conduct
is malicious or in reckless disregard of plaintiff's rights. Al-
though indicating that such a rule of law extended to suits
under an insurance contract and that recovery for emotional
distress would be granted in a proper case, the court stated that
I-E See Nelson v. Crawford, 81 N.W. 335 (Mich. 1899).
107 143 N.W.2d at 614.
"I United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 350 F. Supp. 869 (D.
Conn. 1972).
x Id. at 871.
"' Id. at 872.




in the case at bar the plaintiffs had not sustained their burden
of proof. The tortious conduct alleged was that the company
failed to notify plaintiffs that the company was denying cover-
age until four months after the company decided there was no
coverage. The court ascertained, however, that since the evi-
dence was confusing as to when the insurance company learned
of the lack of coverage, it could not be held that the company
did indeed knowingly withhold notice of the non-coverage for
four months. Hence, the court did not permit recovery for emo-
tional distress because the defendant was not shown to have
acted maliciously or in a reckless disregard of plaintiff's rights.
In a final case of this type,"2 the Court of Appeals of Louis-
iana upheld an award of $750 for humiliation against an insurer
for wrongful refusal to pay a judgment rendered against the
insured. Upon being sued by the other party to an automobile
collision, the insured, Hinson, notified his insurance agent. The
agent failed to forward notification to the insurer, and a default
judgment of $465.70 plus costs and interest was entered against
Hinson. Thereafter, Hinson's wages were garnished; and since
he could not satisfy the judgment, his driver's license and car
licenses were revoked. Even though Hinson demanded that the
insurance company pay the judgment, they refused to do so.
At trial it was determined that since the insurer's agent
was informed of the pending suit, there was sufficient notice to
the insurer; the insurer was therefore liable for the amount of
the judgment entered against Hinson. In addition, the court,
noting that the action was partially in contract and partially
in tort, upheld an award for $750 for the humiliation suffered
as a result of defendant's conduct. ' While this is admittedly
small compensation for the distress suffered by the plaintiff,
the path is at least open for such awards in the future, and in
,,2 Hinson v. Zurich Ins. Co., 196 So. 2d 827 (La. Ct. App. 1967), writ refused, 199
So. 2d 917 (La. 1967).
" Cf. Bell v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 780 (La. Ct. App. 1968), writ
refused, 215 So. 2d 131 (La. 1968); Schecter v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 141 So. 2d 451
(La. Ct. App. 1962). The court in Bell, while failing to distinguish the seemingly
contrary holding of Hinson, found that the trial court was correct in refusing to hear
evidence of plaintiff's claim that defendant insurer's conduct was tortious in refusing
to make payment under two health insurance policies. Though finding that the in-
surer's conduct was arbitrary and unreasonable, which supported a grant of attorney's
fees and a penalty of double the amount due under the contract, the court found the
action to lie solely in contract.
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cases where the conduct of the insurance company is more
clearly outrageous, perhaps awards which sufficiently compen-
sate the insured will be granted.
B. Recovery for Punitive Damages
In addition to those states which allow recovery for mental
suffering against a recalcitrant insurance company, a few
states allow a recovery of punitive damages against such a
defendant. In the recent case of Kirk v. Safeco Insurance Co.,'
the Ohio Court of Common Pleas considered a claim against
the insurer for failure to pay under a homeowner's policy for the
$4,450 loss sustained by the plaintiffs. The court found that the
actions of the insurance company, consisting of a lack of good
faith effort to settle, the mailing of a "nasty" letter, and a total
lack of intention to honor the insured's claim, constituted "a
breach of contract amounting to a wilful, wanton and malicious
tort .... "I 5 The court, therefore, found that punitive damages
of $1,550 should be assessed in addition to attorney's fees of
$2,000. The court stated "very emphatically" that the plain-
tiffs were insureds of the insurance company-not third party
claimants under a liability coverage. Moreover, it observed
that "[e]ven under liability coverages, the insurer must act in
good faith to protect the interests of its insured."'' 8 Thus, al-
though the court seemed to indicate that an insurer owes a
greater duty to its insured under an indemnity policy than
under a liability policy, in either case the insurer is held to a
standard of good faith, a breach of which may result in tort
liability.
The Montana Supreme Court in State ex rel. Larson v.
District Court of the Eighth Judicial District"' enlarged the
number of situations in which exemplary damages can be re-
covered in suits by an insured against his insurance company.
Although expressly stating that it was not changing the general
rule in Montana that punitive damages are not recoverable for
breach of contract, the court, neverthelessheld that where the
actions of the insurance company constituted a violation of the
' 273 N.E.2d 919 (Ohio 1970).
"I Id. at 921.
1" Id., citing Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
" 423 P.2d 598 (Mont. 1967).
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state insurance laws in addition to a breach of contract, puni-
tive damages are recoverable. Since the Montana insurance
statute includes a section' 8 requiring that amounts due under
a policy, except for amounts for which the policy provides peri-
odic payment, must be paid immediately upon proof of loss, it
would appear that in any case of delay or refusal by an insur-
ance company to pay benefits due under a policy there would
be a violation of the state insurance law and the insurer would
thus be liable for punitive damages. The court thus seems to
have greatly increased the opportunities for insured parties in
Montana to collect punitive damages as a means of redress for
the wrongful acts of insurance companies.
C. Recovery for Consequential Damages
Beyond punitive damages and damages for emotional dis-
tress, the courts of two states have held that insured parties
should be permitted to recover consequential damages of var-
ious types in addition to the amounts due under the insurance
policy. Although the cases bear some relevance to this discus-
sion, it should be noted that the courts in these cases have not
changed the law in any respect. In each case, the court, finding
that the action was solely for breach of contract, applied the
generally accepted rules with respect to damages recoverable
in such instances. However, the courts recognized that the
damages which befell the insured as a result of the insurer's
conduct might have been within the contemplation of the par-
ties when the contract was entered into and, if so, that such
damages were recoverable.
In Asher v. Reliance Insurance Co."9 the insured alleged
wrongful conduct on the part of the insurer in failing to make
payments amounting to $14,000 due under a fire insurance
policy. Although holding that punitive damages and damages
for mental suffering were not recoverable in an action for
breach of contract, the court, applying Alaska law, held that,
in addition to compensatory damages, consequential damages
could be recovered if it were found that such damages "were
'proximately caused' by or 'flowed naturally and expectedly'
"' MONT. Rav. CODES ANN. § 40-4011 (1961).
,, 308 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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from the defendant's breach."'' 0 Therefore, the court con-
cluded, the plaintiff's loss of rents due to the insurer's failure
to pay the amounts due could be recovered if, upon the trial of
the matter, it was determined that that kind of damage was
within the contemplation of the parties when the parties en-
tered into the contract.
The court in Asher also recognized that plaintiffs action
might sound in tort and therefore support a claim for damages
for mental suffering and punitive damages if plaintiff could
prove, as he alleged, that there was fraud in the inducement
of the insurance contract. However, the court did not indicate
whether or not the actions of the insurer in refusing to pay the
claim constituted tortious conduct.
This same question of consequential damages was con-
fronted by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Pennsylvania
Threshermen and Farmers' Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Messenger.'2' Therein, the plaintiff's automobile liability in-
surer refused to defend a suit brought against plaintiff as a
result of his involvement in an accident while driving his truck.
Contending that the accident was not covered by the policy,
the company also refused to pay the judgment subsequently
entered against the insured. As a result of his inability to pay
the judgment, the insured lost his truck and trailer; in the
ensuing action against the insurer he sought recovery for the
cost of these items in addition to the amount due under the
policy. Since the policy did not cover damages to insured's
vehicles, the insurer contended that plaintiff should not be able
to collect for the truck and trailer. The court, however, after
finding that the policy did indeed cover the accident, held that
the insured could recover for the damages which naturally
arose from the breach of contract on the part of the insurance
company. Noting that a plaintiff cannot ordinarily recover
damages for the detention of money due him under an insur-
ance policy (other than an allowance for interest), the court,
nevertheless, held that when an insurer willfully refuses to per-
form the obligations of his contract, it will be liable for all loss
caused by the breach. Hence,-the court here was apparently not
concerned, as was the court in Asher, with whether the dam-
,22 Id. at 852.
21 29 A.2d 653 (Md. 1943).
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ages were within the contemplation of the parties, as long as
they naturally flowed from the defendant's breach.
IV. STATUS OF THE LAW IN KENTUCKY
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, along with the courts of
most other jurisdictions,'2 2 has held that an insurer has a duty
to act in good faith when deciding whether to settle a claim
against the insured. Like the California courts, the Court of
Appeals has found that there is a covenant of good faith and
fair dealing implied in every insurance contract which must
guide the actions of the insurer in considering whether to settle
the claim within policy limits.' 3 The Court has not, however,
indicated that this implied covenant requires the high stan-
dard of conduct on the part of the insurer that is required by
the California courts. Neither has it found that a breach of this
duty gives rise to liability as extensive as that imposed by the
California courts. The general rule in Kentucky is that an in-
surer will be held liable for any excess judgment entered
against the insured party when the insurer in bad faith refuses
to settle the claim.' 4 Bad faith has been interpreted as some-
thing more culpable than mere negligence or error in judg-
ment'25 and has been characterized by the Court of Appeals as
follows:
It imports a dishonest purpose of some moral obliquity. It
implies conscious doing of wrong. It means a breach of a
known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. It
partakes of the nature of fraud .... It means "with actual
intent to mislead or deceive another.' '2 6
Although repeatedly recognizing the duty imposed upon
an insurer when determining whether or not to settle a claim,
seldom has the Kentucky Court of Appeals actually imposed
121 Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955).
'3 Grundy v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 425 S.W.2d 735 (Ky. 1968). See also
American Sur. Co. v. J.F. Schneider & Son, 307 S.W.2d 192 (Ky. 1957).
"I4 American Sur. Co. v. J.F. Schneider & Son, 307 S.W.2d 192 (Ky. 1957); Georgia
Cas. Co. v. Mann, 46 S.W.2d 777 (Ky. 1932).
"I Terrell v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 427 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1968); Harrod v.
Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 389 S.W.2d 74 (Ky. 1964).
zI Harrod v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 389 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Ky. 1964), citing Spiegel
v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 8 N.E.2d 895, 907 (Mass. 1937).
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liability upon an insurer for a breach of this duty.12 When such
a breach is found, damages are limited to the amount of the
judgment entered against plaintiff in excess of the policy lim-
its. 12 In no case have consequential damages or damages for
mental suffering been allowed against an insurer for refusal to
settle a claim against its insured within policy limits. 29
With regard to the liability of an insurer for refusal to
make payments due under a policy, the law in Kentucky is
even more restrictive. In such cases the action is generally
viewed as one for breach of contract, and damages are generally
not recoverable against the intransigent insurance company for
its refusal to pay the amounts due under the policy.1 0 In Clark
v. Life & Casualty Insurance Co.'3' the plaintiff sought $5,000
for humiliation and suffering caused by an insurer's wrongful
denial of liability under a burial insurance policy taken out on
the life of plaintiffs wife. Because the insurer denied liability,
the mortician would not extend credit to the plaintiff after the
death of his wife; therefore, the plaintiff literally had to beg
and borrow money in order to properly bury his wife. Noting
that with few exceptions consequential damages cannot be re-
covered for mere breach of a promise to lend or pay money, the
Court held that plaintiffs claim for humiliation and suffering
could not stand.
The same result was reached in Motors Insurance Corp. v.
Jackson,3 1 where the Court held that an insurer could not be
"2 For the only case found in which an insurer was held liable for breach of the
duty, see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marcum, 420 S.W.2d 113 (Ky. 1967).
1' See Terrell v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 427 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1968); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marcum, 420 S.W.2d 113 (Ky. 1967); Harrod v. Meridian Mut.
Ins. Co., 389 S.W.2d 74 (Ky. 1964); American Sur. Co. v. J.F. Schneider & Son, 307
S.W.2d 192 (Ky. 1957).
' No case has been found in which such damages were discussed as allowable.
' But see Motors Ins. Corp. v. Howard, 291 S.W.2d 522 (Ky. 1956), where the
Court held that under the evidence presented (which was not set out in the case) a
verdict of $1,500 could be upheld against the insurer to compensate the insured for loss
of the use of his truck resulting from an unreasonable delay by the insurance company
in making repairs; see also Service Cas. Co. v. Marcum, 386 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1965),
where, though recognizing that in light of Motors Ins. Corp. v. Howard, supra, an
insurer could "under certain circumstances" be held liable for unreasonable delay in
settling a claim, the Court did not find such circumstances present in the case before
it and failed to delineate what those circumstances might be.
13 53 S.W.2d 968 (Ky. 1932).
132 340 S.W.2d 610 (Ky. 1960).
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held liable for consequential damages resulting from its wrong-
ful refusal to make the payments due under a collision insur-
ance policy. After the insurer's denial of liability under the
policy (based upon alleged misrepresentations in the applica-
tion for insurance) and its refusal to pay the repair bill for the
insured's truck, the truck was repossessed and sold due to the
plaintiff's failure to pay an installment on the vehicle. The
plaintiff sought damages for loss of the truck as well as for loss
of earnings resulting from the repossession. While holding that
he could recover the amount due under the policy, the Court
found that the evidence did not establish that the repossession
of the vehicle resulted from the failure of the insurance com-
pany to pay the repair bill. It noted, however, without elabora-
tion that even if the evidence had been sufficient to establish
that the insurer's actions caused the loss, there still would have
been no liability on the part of the insurer for the consequential
damages suffered by the insured.
In General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Judd33
the Court of Appeals concluded that Jackson correctly stated
the law in this area. Therefore, where the insurance company
chose to pay money rather than repair the damaged vehicle,
consequential damages awarded to the insured by the jury for
storage and loss of use of the vehicle were not allowed to stand
even though found to be the result of the insurer's failure to pay
the amount necessary for repairs, as established by estimates
obtained by the plaintiff."4
The Kentucky Court again stated its position on the allow-
ance of consequential damages for an insurer's refusal to make
payments due under a policy in the recent case of United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Fyffe.'35 In this case, which
involved an automobile collision policy, the jury returned a
verdict allowing recovery against the insurer for $551 in addi-
tion to the amount due under the policy. The additional
amount did not represent interest on the money due under the
policy but, instead, was awarded to the insured to compensate
' 400 S.W.2d 685 (Ky. 1966).
' The Court distinguished Motors Ins. Corp. v. Howard, 291 S.W.2d 522 (Ky.
1956), on the ground that in that case the insurance company elected to repair the
insured vehicle rather than pay money as in the present case.
"' 471 S.W.2d 23 (Ky. 1971).
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him for interest which he had paid to a finance company in
fulfilling his obligation under a conditional sales contract made
when he bought the car. The Court of Appeals, however,
viewed the allowance for interest as tantamount to a recovery
of consequential damages and therefore reversed the judgment
with respect to that element of plaintiff's recovery.
It thus appears that the Kentucky Court of Appeals views
an insurance contract as no different than any other contract,
allowing no recovery to compensate an insured party for dam-
ages resulting from the insurer's delay or refusal to pay
amounts due under the policy. Moreover, the insurer is not
held to a higher standard than any other party to a contract
and is in 'no way punished for taking advantage of its policy-
holder.
V. CONCLUSION
As can be seen by the cases discussed herein, there appears
to be a trend developing in various states to impose liability
upon insurers for misconduct in dealings with their insureds.
Though not calling it such, the California courts have imposed
upon every insurer an obligation closely related to a fiduciary
duty, and as a result, aggrieved policyholders are now afforded
protection against the more powerful insurer. The insurer is
subjected to liability for consequential damages, punitive dam-
ages and damages for mental suffering if this duty is breached.
While the allowance of these damages will serve to better com-
pensate the insured, it should also have a deterrent effect on
the unscrupulous conduct of insurers.
In other states which have broadened the insurer's liability
to some extent, the insurance company is likewise aware that
it must exercise care in its dealings with insured parties lest the
insured be permitted to recover substantial damages resulting
from extreme misconduct. The insurer will thus be "punished"
by having to pay more than the amount of the original claim
submitted by the insured.
On the other hand, those states, like Kentucky, that have
refused to broaden the scope of the insurer's liability beyond
the amount originally due under the policy, often deny helpless
policyholders a remedy for the damages caused by insurance
companies that take advantage of the very people they have
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contracted to protect. Instead, those states are condoning such
behavior by the insurers. By refusing in bad faith to pay legiti-
mate claims or by taking advantage of its superior position to
attempt to force an unfair settlement, an insurer in such juris-
dictions runs the risk of losing no more than it would have if it
had made the payments immediately upon submission of the
claim. In view of the fact that some claimants may never seek
the help of a court in forcing a company to make the required
payments, the unscrupulous insurance company, as the law
stands today, has nothing to lose and everything to gain by
delaying or refusing a claim. Moreover, when an insured is
restricted to collecting only the amount due under the policy,
it is difficult to believe that he really is getting what he
was originally entitled to "if it comes only after years of bat-
tling the unarguably superior resources of the company, de-
ducting sometimes-monstrous contingent fees and always-
irksome costs, and frequently weathering a plentitude of abuse
and harassment in the bargain." 3 '
In light of the number of courts that are beginning to rec-
ognize that an insurer should be punished for its wrongful ac-
tivities and that the insured should be sufficiently compen-
sated for the damages suffered as a result of such conduct, it
is possible that, if given the opportunity to reconsider the ques-
tion, the Kentucky Court of Appeals hopefully will decide that
it is time that the policyholder be given a meaningful remedy
against the unscrupulous insurer. The insurer would then be
forced to deal fairly with its policyholders or suffer the unpleas-
ant consequences.
It must be conceded that, with the adoption of a rule per-
mitting the recovery of consequential damages, damages for
mental suffering, or punitive damages against an insurer, there
will arise the problem of possible excessive judgments against
insurance companies. However, the courts have always re-
tained the power to refuse to enter a judgment that is excessive,
and in such a case the plaintiff is often willing to accept a
remittitur to a more reasonable sum in order to forestall further
litigation. The great need to compensate the insured and to
I Lascher, The Imposition of Punitive Damages in the Enforcement of Insurance
Contracts, 1971 PROCEEDINGS 220 (American Bar Association Section of Insurance,
Negligence and Compensation Law).
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deter the bad faith conduct of the insurer must not continue
to be ignored merely because of the possibility of future exces-
sive judgments.
Sandra M. Varellas

